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240 BLISS tI. CALIJ'ORNIA COOPERATIVE PRODUCEBS l30 C.~d 
[Sac. Wo. 5729. In Bank. June 3, 1947.] 
CHARLES A. BLISS et aI., Respondents, v. CALIFORNIA 
COOPERATIVE PRODUCERS (a Cooperative Cor-
poration) et aI., Defendants; I. C. SmDLER et aI., 
Appellants. 
[1] Negotiable IDstnunenta -Rolders In Due Oourse-Time of 
Transfer. - A transferee of a negotiable installment note 
taken after maturity of one or more but less than all of the 
installments is not a holder in due eou:rse as to installments 
that have become due. 
[2] IeL-Holders in Due Course-Time of Transfer.-A transferee 
of an installment note is a holder in due course as to install-
ments to mature in the future when the transfer is made after 
one or more but not all of the installments are due on its 
face, ttnless the past due installments have not in fact been 
paid and he has notiee of that faet. 
[3] Id.-Actions-Findinp.-In an action by pledgees of install-
ment notes of mf!mbers of the pledg'Or mat'keting corporation 
and involving the issue of plaintiff's notice of the failut'e to 
pay the first installment, findings that the plaintiffs were bona 
fide holders without notice of any defenses and also that they 
were not holders in due course are unsatisfactoTy. 
[4] OontTactI - Breach - Failure of Oonsideration. - Failure of 
consideration is the failure to execute a promise, the per-
formance of which has been exchanged for performance by 
the other party. Such failure may arise from the willfnl 
breach of the promise. 
[6] Id. - Actions-Defentes-Failure of Oonsideration. - Failure 
of consideration is a defense to an action for breach of a 
bilateral contract inasmuch as it is contemplated that the 
performance of the ttnilateral promises shall be in exchange 
for each other, the performance being considered as equivalent 
in value. 
[8] Wegotiable Instruments-Oonsideration-Faflure of Oonsider-
ation. - There is a failure of consideration for agricultural 
producers' notes executed by members of a cooperative corpo-
[1] Maturity of one or more of series of notes as affecting 
status of purchaser as holder in due course, note, 64 A.L.B. 457; 
170 A.L.ll 1029. See, also, 19 OaLJur. 861, 999; 7 Am.Jur. 874; 
8 Am.Jur. 178. 
Melt. Dig. Beferences: [1, 2] Negotiable Instruments, § 66; [31 
Negotiable Instruments, § 280; [4, 7J Contracts, § 241; [5] Con-
tracts, § 274; [6] Negotiable Instruments, § 28; [8] Assignment., 
I 66; [~l JWoppeI, I.; [10] CorpoatioBe, If. 
) 
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ration in consideration of the corporation's marketing of the 
members' products and paying premiums on policies on the 
members' lives, where the corporation, after its insolvency, 
fails to handle the members' products and maintain the 
policies in effect. 
(7) Oontracts - Breach. - The insolvency of a promisor. in a bi-
lateral continuing oontract is tantamOUDt to a breach of the 
contract by him. 
. [8] Assignments - Bights and LiabUitf.ea of Parties - Defensea 
. Available ApiDst Assipeea. -Generally, an assignee of a 
ohose in action takes subject to all equities and defenses exist-
ing at or before the notice of the assignment. But where there 
is a failure of consideration under a bilateral contract con-
sisting of a breaoh by the assignor, such failure is a good 
· defense to an action by the assignee, whether it occurred be-
fore or after the notice of assignment. 
· Est;oppel-Conduct.-Where agricultural produoers' notes exe-
· ented by members of a oooperative corporation in consider-
· ation of the corporation's marketing of the members' products 
and paying premiums on policies on the members' lives were 
. pledged by the corporation as security for its note, and that 
fact was known to members of the corporation, the mere fact 
that they continued to market their products through the 
corporation did not estop them, in an action on the notes, 
from raising the defense of failure of consideration based on 
the eOrporation's subsequent insolvency. 
Corporations-Disregard of Oorporate BntitJ'.-m an action 
agricultural producers' notes pledged by a cooperative 
. corporation as security for its note to plaintifts, there was ne 
'. basis for disregarding the corporate entity and considering 
'it the alter ego of its members where it was not a nonstaek, 
,"nonproftt corporation but one in which persons other than 
Itoekholders could share in the proftts, and where it borrowed 
,from plainti«s on its own liability, not on that of the mam-
,ben. 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Saera-
,.County. Kaleolm C. Glenn, Judge. Reversed. 
'.a.VI.uM.l on promisso17 notes. Judgment for plaiDti1ls No 
J. GalhnMla, In pt:O. per., ad Kuldary " lIIkiIapm for 
) 
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Albert C. Agnew, John A. O'Kane, Louis Ferrari, Brobeck, 
Phlegcr & Harrison, Randall Boyd, Morrison, Hohfeld, Foer-
ster, Shuman & Clark, Richard W. Young, Cooley, Crowley, 
Gaither & Dana, and Wm. J. Murphy as Amici Curiae, on be-
half of Respondents. 
CARTER, J.--Judgment was given for plaintiffs against 
defendants a.nd appellants Shidler, Winchester and Galbreath 
on three promis.~ory notes of which they were the makers. 
Their defenses, among others, were fraud and failure of con-
sideration. Plaintiffs are the transferees of the notes, the 
payee being California Cooperative Producers, a corporation. 
The series of events leading up to the execution of the notes 
had their beginning in 1926. In that year the idea was con-
ceived by Mr. Johnson, president of the Union Construction 
Company, and a Mr. Campbell, to use the shipping terminal 
facilities and property at the harbor in Oakland, California, 
then held by the Union Construction Company under a lease 
from the city of Oakland, for a terminal for processing and 
shipping agricultural products. It was proposed to form a 
corporation to be known as California Cooperative Producers 
(hereinafter referred to as the corporation, which was later 
formed), as the instrumentality to conduct the enterprise. A 
promotional firm, Allen, Hobson and Simons, a copartner-
ship, was engaged under contract of April 15, 1927, to pro- ' 
mote and organize the business and conduct a campaign to 
induce growers of agricultural products to let the corporation 
handle their products. The corporation was incorporated on 
April 26, 1927, with a capital stock of $15,000 ullJcr the then 
section 653 (a) of the Civil Code authorizing ordinary busi-
ness corporations to divide a portion of their profits among 
persons other than their stockholders. The stock (other than 
director's qualifying shares) was to be issued only to associa-
tions of producers (which were to be organized) who marketed 
their products through the corporation. Johnson was named 
president and Hobson and Allen directors of the corporation. 
Pursnant to a permit therefor one share of stock was issued 
to each director. 
The promotional firm launched its drive, made financial 
arrangements, and obtained manufacturing and marketing 
contracts, hereafter called marketing contracts, for the corpo-
ration from many producers of agricultural products, in-
cluding the three appellants, in which the producers agreed 
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to market their products through the corporation. Appel-
lants, as producers, were members of either one or the other 
of two producers' associations formed pursuant to the plan. 
The associations' manufacturing and marketing agreement, 
hereafter referred to as association contract, with its member-
producers and the marketing contracts required its members 
... to deliver their products to the corporation. The marketing 
oOlIltra.cts called for the procurement of policies of insurance 
the lives of the producers, the corporation to pay the 
premiums, and provided: "In order to assist in the manu-
taetnring and/or marketing of said products, and in further 
eoDsideration of the payment of the premiums on policies of 
endowment life insurance on the life (name of defendant 
III£gning same) for the amount of (amount of insurance is-
, and when issued and assigned to California Cooper-
. a't{ve Producers, said producer hereby extends his credit to 
California Cooperative Producers in the amount of a certain 
(Jl~lniSISOl~ note of even date herewith in the principal sum of 
~:......;..- (amount of note executed, and sued for herein) made 
._~~. __ .. _ producer in favor of said California Cooperative Pro-
The notes involved were executed in 1927 as a part 
" transaction by appellants and were noninterest bearing 
llellOtlable instruments payable in annual installments. The 
of the notes was arrived at by an estimate of the 
produce to be delivered by the producer and maker of 
to the corporation. 
17. 1928, the corporation pledged the notes to 
~inti1fs, together with others, as security for the payment of 
for $5,000 in which the corporation was maker and 
. 'payees. The pledge was made in the usual course of 
and under circumstances which would indicate that 
~IL.uLIf were holders in due course and thus the defenses 
a'lfS"U would not be available unless some other factor took 
of the favored position. 
found that plaintiffs acquired the notes in good 
without notice of any defenses of appellants. (As 
the defenses were fraud and failure of consider-
The first installment on the principal of appellants' 
due on ,January 2, 1928. The transfer (on 
17, 1928) was after that date, hence we have the issue 
. a transferee of an installment note is a holder in 
IO'ftI,n_."" where the tr!ln~fcl' is mnde after one or more but 
ali. of the installments are due. (In this connection 
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it should be noted that in the instant case the notes did not 
contain an automatic acceleration clause upon default in the 
payment of an installment, thus we do not decide the law in 
that situation.) 
[1] On the issue of whether or not the transferee of a 
negotiable installment note taken after the maturity of one 
or more or less than all of the installments, is a holder in due 
course, reference must first be made to the negotiable instru-
ments law as embodied in our statutes: .. A holder in due 
course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the 
following conditions: (1) ..• (2) That he became the holder 
of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been 
previously dishonored, if such was the fact"; (Civ. Code, I 
§ 3133.) "The instrument is dishonored by nonpayment when I 
(1) ... (2) Presentment is excused and the instrument is 
overdue and unpaid." (Civ. Code, § 3164.) To determine! 
whether a note is "overdue" when less than all of the install-
ments are unpaid it must be noted that installment notes are 
expressly made negotiable by the statute. "The sum payable 
is a sum certain within the meaning of this act, although it is 
to be paid-(l) . " (2) By stated installm6ft.fI; or (3) By 
stated installments, with a provision that upon default in 
payment for any installment or of interest, the whole shall 
become due" [emphasiR added] (Civ. Code, § 3083), and th . 
policy is stated: "There is no doubt that the fact that a no 
is payable by installments does not destroy its negotiability. 
The authorities seem to be in favor of the continued negotia 
bility of the note after the indorsement of payments thereo 
In ease of an installment note, the time for the payment 0 
each installment is fixed 80 that it is within the rule requirin 
certainty as to time of payment. By the Uniform Act it . 
declared that the sum payable is a sum certain although it . 
to be paid by stated installments." (7 Am.Jur., Bills an 
Notes, § 150.) This policy would be impaired if a note 
came in effect nonnegotiable before less than all of the install 
ments became due. A vast number of credit transactiO~ 
might be thus jeopardized. As to the installments that hav 
become due the transferee cannot be a holder in due COUl'S 
/ for that portion of the note is undoubtedly overdue but 
to the future installments he mayor may not be such 
holder, depending upon the factors presently discussed. r 
[9] It has been stated repeatedly, as a general propos] 
tion, under the negotiable instruments law and the commol 
I 
) 
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. JaW that the transferee of an installment note is not a holder 
in due course as to any part of the note when the transfer 
. haB been made after the maturity of one or more but less 
~. than all of the installments. (Cases in which uniform nego-
~'\iable instruments law not mentioned: HaZZ v. E. W. Wells 
SOfa, 24 Cal.App. 238 [141 P. 53]; Archtoald Hardwar, Co. 
Rt.ff,ord. 44 Ga.App. 837 [163 S.E. 254; General Motors 
~r:,f_ce Corp v. Talbott, 39 Idaho 707 [230 P. 30]; Vin-
King, 4 Allen (Mass.) 562; McCorkle v. Miller, 64 1\10 • 
. 153; turns on lack of payment Shadman v. O'Brien. 278 
579 [180 N.E. 532]: Norwood v. Leeves (Tex.Civ.App.). 
W. 53; First Nat. Bank v. Forsyth, 67 Minn. 257 [69 
' .. 909. '64 Am.St.Rep. 415 J. Cases decided under the 
"'""""~.;.;,'- negotiable instruments law: Hibbard v. Collim, 127 
[143 A. 600]; City of New Port Richey v. Fidelity c6 
Co., 105 F.2d 348 [123 A.L.R. 1352]; United States 
55 F.Supp. 81; see 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes, § 312; 
Negotiable Instruments [7th ed.], vol. 2. § 910; 
11aJn'.£~..u.oI:JY. 464; 40 Barv.L.Rev. 634; 8 Am.Jur., Bills 
. § 432; 64 A.L.R. 457.) These cases stresS the point 
. the' installment was unpaid as well as being overdue on 
. • . factor of significance. More is required. There 
little free commerce in installment instruments if 
accept::ing the same the transferee was required to ascer-
whlBthlar or not the past due installments had been paid. 
. may assume that the regular course of business has 
.[fOllawed (Code Civ. Proo., § 1963), and that each install-
paid when due. It is not significant, like it is where 
l::.1JrJlo][e prin'CiPlU is overdue, that the note is still in the 
payee or holder. Where the whole principal is 
that should warn the transferee that the note prob-
. been dishonored and there may be some reason for 
would constitute a defense. The possession by the 
of an installment note before all of the install-
,due does not signify dishonor. The holder would 
retain it for collection of the balance of the in-
If, however, the installments due on the face of 
:'m!lti'1lDD.llmt have not been paid and the framferN ha.t 
. ,fhGf facf, he is put on inquiry that there may be 
r cI.4~eIlSe8 against it and he cannot be a holder in due 
is said in United States v. Copen, 55 F.Supp. 81, 
"-uJ""_.~ the principal of a note is payable in installments 
iDstallment is overdue and unpaid at the time of 
/ 
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transfer of the note, the transferee is not a holder before 
maturity and hence is not a holder in due course, unless he 
does not take with notice of the past-due installment." 
[Emphasis added.] Therefore, the rule is that a transferee 
of an installment note is a holder in due course as to the 
installments to mature in the future when the transfer is 
made after one or more but not all of the installments are due 
on its face unless the past due installments hne not in faet 
been paid and he has notice of that fact. 
The decision in this case must turn on whether the install-
ment due on January 2,. 1928. had been paid, and if not, 
whether plaintiffs had notice thereof. In regard to payment 
of the first installment, plaintiffs alleged in their complaint i 
that no part of the principal had been paid on any of appel-
lants' notes, an allegation in substance that the first install- : 
ment had not been paid. That allegation was denied by ap- : 
pellants, which amounts to an assertion that the installment 
had been paid. We thus have the peculiar situation of plain-
tiffs and appellants taking positions in their pleadings oppo-
site to their interests under the rule of law as above stated. 
Under that rule plaintiffs' position now requires a claim that 
the installment was paid, and appellants, that it was unpaid. 
The court found that all of plaintiff~' allegations were true, 
thus finding that the first installment had not been paid. It 
also found (and it would Reem to be conflieting) that pUrsu!:ut 
to the marketing contracts appellants delivered produce to 
the corporation in 1927. and the corporation on August 31, 
1928 (after the transfer of the notes) entered credits on its 
books for the first installment; that plaintiffs were not holders 
in due course because the note.~ were transferred after the 
first installment was due but that "plaintiffs were purchasers 
and holders of said notes in good faith and for value and 
without notice of any equity or defense in favor of defend-
ants or any of them; and in this connection the court finds 
that in each instance said California Cooperative Producem 
had in its possession and under its control pursuant to and 
under the said Financing and Manufacturing and Marketing 
Agreement on said 2nd day of February, 1928. money, prop-
erty or credits belonging to each of said defendants. being the 
products or the proceeds of the products of such defendants, 
delivered pursuant to said Financing and Manufacturing and 
Marketing Agreement suffieient in value or amount to pay, 
satisfy and discharge the amount of said First Installment 
) 
) 
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payments of each of said respective promissory notes in full." 
The court further found that the notes were not to be paid 
by credits for fruit deli\'ered by the growers (appellants) 
- stating: "It is not true that it was represented by said Pro-
dueers to said defendants [appellants], or any of them, that 
DO payment would be required to be made by the signers of 
Iiid notes; or that as each yearly installment became on the 
'face of the note due or payable to said California Cooperative 
Producers, said California Cooperative Producers would debit 
.~ balance of the amount of the yearly installment then due 
'to 8I1id signer of said note or charge the same against said 
'Signers credit balance. if any, or that thereafter said Pro-
ducers would assign said sums or any sum, to corporate re-
ffJ'fIS, or any reserves, except as is stated in said Financing 
iiul. Manufaeturing and Marketing Agreement." The court 
t~ judgment for plainti1fs which included the first install-
'.aent m the instance of appellant Winchester, but not as to 
! 
/ 
: Other two appellants. The conclusion as to the latter 
',p:pelllaD'ts was based. however, on the finding that the statute 
UDl.ita1:ion had run upon the first installment as to those 
It is evident from the foregoing that the court 
that the crop which had been delivered to the corpora-
. by appellants did not constitute payment. Although it 
the existence of the credits by the delivery of the crop 
" fhat the first instaUment had not been paid and gave 
{JndglneJlt for it, thus indicating that it considered that the 
rtirlBdi1t& did not constitute payment. a matter which may have 
fJUrnelCl on the intention of the parties. Therefore, it has been 
lJ!~milled in this case that the first of the two conditions, 
1l0l1pll.yment of the past due installment, which makes 
~;nsj:en!C after maturity of one of the installments not a 
in due course, is present. 
On the subject of notice to plaintiifs of appellants' 
Dflltfte to pay the first installment, the findings are unsatis-
.JtOr,,~' It is found that they (plaintUfs) were bona fide 
without notice of any defenses, but it is also fonnd 
they were not holders in due course. They may not have 
notice of any defenses, yet they may have had notice of 
de1fault and thus were put upon inquiry. In the latter 
they would not be holders in due course. It is evident 
the ftndings that the court did not consider the case in 
light of the law as heretofore stated. The evidence with 
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was done and said when the notes were transferred is not 
clear. The $5,000 note for which the instant collateral notes 
were given as security states: "This note is secured by a 
pledge of the following installment notes, pa~ble to the order 
of the maker hereof." Then follows three columns designated 
"Name of Maker," "Date of Note" and "Amount," respec-
tively, under which each note is listed (Jim.g the fulZ f(JCe 
amott.f of fhe fI,Ofe. It might be inferred from the foregoing 
that the l1rst installment had not been paid. In the state of 
the evidence and the findings we believe the issue of notice 
should be retried. In the event it is found that plaintifrs had 
notice, and were not therefore holders in due course, for the 
guidance of the court we will discuss the issues pertinent to 
the defenses interposed by appellants. 
Thus turning to appellants' defenses, the court found that 
the corporation and its omcers were the agents of appellants 
in the marketing of their products. The stock of the corpora-
tion was to be issued to associations of producers. The corpo-
ration was "in effect owned" by the associations of whieh 
appellants were members. The notes executed by appellants 
were part of the same transaction in which they executed the 
marketing and association contracts. The interest on the 
$5,000 note delivered to plaintiffs by the corporation was paid 
until July 17, 1930, but none of the prineipal was paid al-
though $4,000 of it became due before that date. On the issue 
of appellants' defense of failure of consideration or failure by 
the eorporation to perform under the marketing contract, it 
appears that the corporation failed to pay the premiums on 
the insurance polieies after .July, 1930: that because of its 
insolvency, it has failed to and eould not since then pay such 
premiums or process, manufacture or market appellants' 
products. Failure of consideration is a good defense to an 
action on a negotiable instrument by one not a holder in due 
course. (Civ. Code, § 3109.) [4] Failure of consideration 
is the failure to execute a promise, the performance of which 
has been exchanged for performance by the other party. 
Among other situations, the failure may arise from the wilful 
breach of the promise. [15] And in a bilateral contract, such 
failure of consideration is a defense to an action for a breach 
of the contract inasmuch as it is contemplated that the per-
formance of the unilateral promises shall be in exchange for 
each other, the performance 'being con.cddered as equivalent in 
ftlue. It is said in BrGf v. Lowef'1/, 163 CaL 256, 260 [124: 
JUne 1947] BLISS 11. CALIFORNIA COOPERATIVE PRODUCERS 249 
_ [30 C.2d 240; 181 P.2d 369] 
P. 1004]: "This case therefore comes within the rule stated 
in Richter v. Union Land &; Stock 00., 129 Cal. [367] 372 [62 
P. 40], as follows: 'In all executory contracts the several 
.' obligations of the parties constitute to each, reciprocally, the 
. eonsideration of the contract; and a failure to perform consti-
. a failure of consideration-either partial or total, as 
case may be-within the meaning of section 1689 of the 
Code.' (See, also, Sterling v. Gregory, 149 Cal. {117], 
(85 P. 305], and Oleary v. Polger, 84 Cal. 316 [18 Am.St. 
187, 24 P. 280J.)" (See, also, Mulborn v. Montezuma 
00.,69 Cal.App. 621, 628 [232 P. 162]; Rest., Contracts, 
et seq.; Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.), vol. 3, §§ 813-
[8] In the instant case, although there was no ex-
promise in the marketing contract on the part of the 
~"Dl'1llOnlticln to process and market appellants-producers' prod- . 
nor a fixed time during which the producers agreed to . 
f;·,tll .... , .. _ their products to the corporation, we believe it may , 
" ........... JLY be implied that the promises in that connection were to 
for at least ten years inasmuch as the notes were payable 
annual installments. It will be noted from the here-
If"frrl'm'" quoted paragraph from said contract, that in order to 
in the marketing and processing of the products, and in 
~'*,I.lf"t." .• f" consideration t)f the payment by the corporation of 
premiums on the insurance policies, the notes were given . 
. were given as an extension of credit to the corporation, 
IIInllvn".,. that the corporation was to continue its activities 
the insurance policies in return for the con-
ltIil1Ultion of the extension of credit by the notes which were 
'It'y;"U~'" not in a lump sum, but in ten annual installments. 
court found that the notes were executed for the pur-
. mentioned in the marketing contracts and "at the same 
.' and as a part of the respective transactions." The court 
. found that from 1927 to 1930 pursuant to the marketing 
. . appellants delivered their products to the corpora-
the eorporation entereel creelib tm its books as pay-
on the notes, indicating that the continued operation 
eorporation was exchanged for the payment of the 
D:t~issc)ry note&. A further indication of the reciprocal 
OUitu:J:oe of the promise in the notes and that of the corporation 
[*1.pears from the following clause in the marketing contracts: 
, releue of the Producer from tkli11ering his Hid prod-
or any part thereof in accordance with said Manufactur-
Marketinr .Agreement, or a failure on his part 80 to 
) 
) 
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was done and said when the notes were transferred is not 
clear. The $5,000 note for which the instant collateral notes 
were given as security states: "This note is secured by a 
pledge of the following installment notes, payable to the order 
of the maker hereof." Then follows three columns designated 
''Name of Maker," "Date of Note" and "Amount," respec-
tively, under which each note is listed gimng the fun face 
amount of the 1tOte. It might be inferred from the foregoing 
that the first installment had not been paid. In the state of 
the evidence and the findings we believe the issue of notice 
should be retried. In the event it is found that plaintitts had 
notice, and were not therefore holders in due course, for the 
guidance of the court we will discuss the issues pertinent to 
the defenses interposed by appellants. 
Thus turning to appellants' defenses, the court found that 
the corporation and its officers were the agents of appellants I 
in the marketing of their products. The stock of the corpora- i 
don was to be issued to associations of producers. The corpo-
ration was "in effect owned" by the associations of which 
appellants were members. The notes executed by appellants 
were part of the same transaction in which they executed the 
marketing and association contracts. The interest on the 
$5,000 note delivered to plaintitts by the corporation was paid 
until July 17, 1930, but none of the principal was paid al-
though $4,000 of it became due before that date. On the issue 
of appellants' defense of failure of consideration or failure by 
the corporation to perform under the marketing contract, it 
appears that the corporation failed to pay the premiums on 
the insurance policies after .July, 1930; that because of its 
insolvency, it has failed to and could not since then pay such 
premiums or process, manufacture or market appellants' I 
products. Failure of consideration is a good defense to an 
action on a negotiable instrument by one not a holder in due 
course. (Oiv. Code, § 3109.) [4] Failure of consideration 
is the failure to execute a promise, the performance of which 
has been exchanged for performance by the other party. 
Among other situations, the failure may arise from the wilful 
breach of the promise. [IS] And in a bilateral contract, such 
failure of consideration is a defense to an action for a breach 
of the contract inasmuch as it is contemplated that the per-
formance of the unilateral promises shall be in exchange for 
each other, the performance being considered as equivalent in 
value. It is said in BrGf/ v. 'Lowery, 163 Cal 256, 260 [124 
/ 
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P. 10041: "This ease therefore comes within the rule stated 
in Bichter v.UnWft Land" Stock Co., 129 Cal. [367] 372 [62 
P. 401, as follows: 'In all executory contracts the severa] 
obliga1t101!18 of the parties constitute to each, reciprocally, the 
OOIll8icie1'llticln of the contract; and a failure to perform consti-
a failure of consideration-either partial or total, as 
case may be-within the meaning of section 1689 of the 
Code.' (See, also, Sterling v. Gregory, 149 Cal. [117], 
(85 P. 305], and Cleary v. Folger, 84 Cal. 316 [18 Am.St. 
187, 24 P. 280].)" (See, also. Mulbom v. Montezuma 
Co., 69 Cal.App. 621, 628 [232 P. 162]; Rest., Contracts, 
et seq.; Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.), vol. 3, §§ 813-
[8] In the instant ease, although there was no ex-
promise in the marketing contract on the part of the 
I:"Di'IlI01'l~ti(l.n to process and market appellants-producers' prod-
nor a fixed time during which the producers agreed to 
. their products to the corporation, we believe it may , 
I:tdrllY be implied that the promises in that connection were to : 
for at least ten years inasmuch as the notes were payable 
annual installments. It will be noted from the here-
~tc)fm~ quoted paragraph from said contract, that in order to 
in the marketing and processing of the products. and in 
~~~,,","er COtl8iderGnon. I)f the payment by the corporation of 
premiums on the insurance policies, the notes were given . 
. were given as an extension of credit to. the corporation, 
mnllvDlup that the corporation was to continue ita activities 
mamtam the insurance policies in return for the con-
Dlii1Ulti(lU of the extension of credit by the notes which were 
!ll,Ya,w." 'not in a lump sum, but in ten annul installments. 
found that the notes were executed for the pur-
mentionEId in the marketing contracts and "at the same 
as a part of the respective transactions." The court 
iJaA;·~_._" that from 1927 to 1930 pur8'IUJnt to the marketing 
.'Ncb appellan.ta delivered their products. to the corpora-
the corporation en.tered credit. Oft it. books as pay-
~1l'tI OIl the nOtes, indicating that the continued OPeNtion 
corporation was exchanged for the payment of the 
~!Om_)ry DOtal. A further indication of the reciprocal 
0ii1me of the promise in the notes and that of the corporation 
Mpea:ra from the following e1ause in the marketing contracts: 
. reltM. of the Producer from deUtI.ring Au MJid prod-
or any part thereof in accordance with said Manufactur-
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deliver his said products or any part thereof, shaZl 110t release 
the maker from any pot·tion of his liability under said promis-
sory note." [Emphasis added.] The producers were obli-
gated on the note even if they violated their agreement to 
deliver their produce. It necessarily follows that if they did 
deliver their products and were able and willing to do so in 
the future, the corporation was under an equal obligation to 
continue to receive, process and market it as long as the in-
stallments on the notes continued to become due. 
The breach of the marketing contracts consisted of the 
failure after 1930 to handle appallants' products and maintain 
the insurance policies in force arising from the voluntary 
bankruptcy of the corporation in that year rendering it in-
capable of further performance. [7] The insolvency of a 
promisor in a bilateral continuing contract is tantamount to a 
breach of the contract by him. rOaminetti v. Pacific Mnt. 
Life Ins. 00., 23 Cal.2d 94 [142 P.2d 741]; Oentral Trust 00. 
v. Ohicago Auditorium Assn., 240 U.S. 581 [36 S.Ct. 412, 60 
L.Ed. 811].) 
PlaintUfs urge that the asserted failure of consideration did 
not occur until after appellants had notice of the transfer of 
their notes to plaintUfs and thus the failure of consideration 
is not a defense. [8] The general rule is that an assignee 
of a chose in action is subject to all equities and defenses 
existing at or before the notice of the assignment. (Civ. 
Code, § 1459; Code Civ. Proc., § 368; 3 Cal.Jur. pp. 286-289.) 
But where there is a failure of consideration under a bilateral 
contract consisting of a breach by the assignor, such failure 
is a good defense to an action by the assignee whether it oc-
curred before or after the notice of assignment. It is said: 
"On the other hand, payment to the assignor or other de-
fenses acquired by the debtor against the assignor after notice 
of the assignment are invalid, unless the defense, though ac-
quired after notice, is based on a right of the defendant in-
here",t in the contract by its terms; Thus if payments under 
aft. e:ucutory contract are assigned, the debtor may set up 
failure of the assignor to fulfil1, his pari of the contract though 
such fa,&7/ure occurs after notice of the assignment, for the 
assignor cannot give another 8 larger right than he has him-
self; ... " [Emphasis added.] (Williston on Contract, (rev. 
ed.), vol. 2, § 433.) In Stern v. Sunset Road Otl 00., 47 Cal 
App. 334 [190 P. 651], the court held that recoupment was 
available to the debtor against the assignee althougb the 
.~) 
.) 
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breach of the contract by the assignor occurred after notice of 
the assignment. (See, also, Pacific RoZling Mill Co. v. EngZish, 
118 Cal. 123 [50 P. 383]; Rest., Contracts, §§ 161, 167(1), 
i illus. 3.} Plaintifrs refer to the statement in 19 California 
Jurisprudence page 1002 that: "[A] failure of consideration 
bi whole or in part after the transfer of an instrument to a 
· bona fide holder is no defense in a suit by such holder, not-
withstanding his full knowledge of the original consideration 
· for which the paper was given." The cases cited for that 
proposition (Flood v. Petry, 165 Cal. 309 [132 P. 256, 46 
L.B.A.N.S. 861J; Bank of TJkio,h v. Gibson, 109 Cal. 197 [41 
P. 1008]; SplivaZlo v. Patten, 38 Cal. 138 {99 Am.Dec. 358]; 
· Pratt v. Dittmer, 51 Cal.App. 512 [197 P. 365]; First Nat. 
Bnk v. Pickert, 51 Cal.App. 99 [196 P. 112]) concern sima-
. dons where a negotiable note given as a part of a contract 
l;tranB&C1aon was transferred before maturity to a bona fide 
Dm~~ in the regular course of business. In other words, 
transferee was a holder in due course. The court merely 
that the knowledge of the transferee that the note was 
.. consideration for an executory promise in the eon-
. but without notice that the promise had not been per-
:l.UJ:W"",,, was insuJ1ieient to destroy his status as a holder in 
. In the instant ease, assuming that plaintifrs were 
hOl(lers in due course because of notice of nonpayment of 
ins1~neIllt, the availability of the defense here asserted 
dependent upon actual notice of equities in. favor of 
1;.~p.Pelllan·ts. The general rule has been repeatedly stated that 
.4tt~81!JSignee of a note who is not a holder in due course takes 
.lllbjelOt to all defenses that would be available against the 
I:dlqllOr, one of such defenses being failure of consideration. 
E~.:,?liiUJi1;i1fs contend that there was no failure of consideration 
notes were pledged to them. (That, as we have 
......... -,-•. --. immaterial) [9] And further, that appellants have 
,-,~yed the fraitI of the marketing contract with the corpora-
hence are estopped to raise the defense of failure of 
E~.~eJl'8.ti.on. The failure of consideration was, as above 
failure and inability after insolvency of the corpo-
1fi-f''''''''"U to continue to accept, process and market appellants' 
.1~lucts and maintain the life insurance policies in effect. 
connection the court found : "That on or about the 
day of May, 1928 [appellants] became aware of the 
. . of their respective notes • • • to plainti1fs, . • . ; 
, 'said [corporation] was declared a baDkrupt __ vol ... 
) 
) 
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tary petition September 5th, 1930; that during the whole time 
between said dates, [appellants] continued as members of 
said corporation and said producers associations [the associa-
tions who were stockholders in the corporation] and delivered 
and marketed their products through said corporation, en-
joyed and received the· benefits of the insurance on their 
respective lives, the premiums on which insurance were paid 
by the corporation; aceepted and retained the benefits of the 
money borrowed from plaintiffs [the $5,000 borrowed by the 
corporation for which appellants' notes were pledged as secur-
ity], which money was used in the processing and marketing 
of the products of [appellants], as above recited, and all other 
bene:6ts of their membership in and affiliation with said [cor-
poration] and said Growers Associations, but they never at 
any time repudiated or rescinded or attempted to rescind the 
said transactions between themselves and said corporation or 
between said corporations and plaintiffs herein. 
". • • That [appellants] ~ by the execution of said • • • 
){arkating [contract] .•• by the execution of said notes, and 
by delivering the same to said corporation for the purpose of 
extending to it their credit in the amount of said notes, 
thereby enabling said corporation to borrow said $5,000 from 
plaintiffs; by the receipt of the benefits of life insurance on 
their respective lives, and the benefits of said loan by plain-
tUrs to said defendant corporation, and by all other benefits 
provided in said ••• Marketing [contraet]; and by continu-
ing as members of said corporation after the borrowing of 
said money as aforesaid, and after they had knowledge of the 
borrowing of said money as aforesaid, and after having knowl-
edge of the transfer of their notes as security therefor, and 
all of the other matters and things herein found to be tru_, 
said [appellants], rati:6ed the acts of said corporation in hor-
rowing said money from plaintUfs, and transferring said notes 
to plainti1fs as security for its repayment; and they are by 
their said acts and conduct, and by the benefits they received 
as herein found, estopped from setting up &DT defense to this 
action on the ground of any alleged fraud ••• , or from mak-
ing any other defense thereto, • • • and that by their said 
acts and conduct as herein found, said defendants waived any 
and all rights that they may or might have had to set up 
&DT defense to this action on the ground of any alleged fraud 
practiced by their said agent, California Cooperative Pro-
a.e., • itI apnt, .. from makinl aDT other defensea 
J 
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thereto, as to the matters hereinabove found." We do not 
find any estoppel or reason springing from the foregoing 
circumstances which prevent appellants defending on the 
ground of failure of consideration. The awareness on their 
part of the pledge of their notes to secure the payment of 
the $5,000 did not impose upon them any duty with respect to 
the assignees. They could assume that inasmuch as the as-
signees had no greater rights then, and were subject to the 
same defenses as the corporation-assignor, they would govern 
their acts and protect themselves accordingly. Certainly they 
continued as members of the associations, which were stock-
. holders in the corporation, and delivered their products to the 
corporation. They were bound to do that under the market-
. and association contracts and were privileged to assume 
the corporation would continue its performance and that 
plaintiffs-assignees would be subject to the defenses aria-
from the failure of the corporation-assignor to perform. 
APPl;U.lAUUS did receive the benefits of the marketing contracts 
r/::lIl1'iclr to insolvency but they were entitled to receive them 
those contracts. Plaintiffs cite Maddock v. Russen, 109 
417 [42 P. 139], and Rohrbacher v. KleebaU6r, 119 Cal. 
P. 341J, for the proposition that appellants cannot 
fl~I)D).]~lalin because they have enjoyed the fruits of the contracts. 
are not in point inasmuch as the contracts here 
.~nvl,I",~ are the marketing contracts and there has been a 
.~aill1re of consideration therein as above stated. The corpora-
has been unable to perform since 1930. Appellants did 
rescind the contracts. They had no grounds for doing 80 
. far as failure of consideration is concerned. There was no 
1~a.il11re of consideration until the insolvency of the corpora-
Appellants did nothing to mislead plaintiffs. It is not 
that they promised to pay the $5,000 the corporation 
. or to pay to plaintiffs the notes executed by them. 
' ... to the insolvency they did not waive the defense of 
. of consideration. It had not falled as yet and there 
JjncJtblinQ/ to indicate that they did 80 as to a future possi-
a breach by the corporation. 
Running through the above quoted finding of the 
an undercurrent intimating that the corporation was 
ego of the appellants-producers and the associations 
they belonged; that the insolvency was their act; 
. that hence the $5,000 note was really their note. The 
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said 'Producers Associations' composed of the fruit growers, 
the latter constituting the membership of the 'Producers As-
sociation,' and these fruit growers were also direct.Iy con-
nected with the California Cooperative Producers by the 
Financing, Manufactu.ring and Marketing agreement exe-
cuted by each ()f them." And that "said corporation and 
its officers were agents of [appellants) in the marketing of 
their products." We see no basis for disregarding the corpo-
rate entity. It was not a nonstock, nonprofit cooperative 
corporation. It WiiS one in which persons other than stock-
holders could share in the profits. Accepting the agency rela-
tionship the marketing contracts were still binding and the 
corporation-agent was obligated to perform theretmder. The 
. borrowing of the $5,000 by the corporation from plaintiffs 
was on its own liability, not on that of the members. If that 
were not so, we would be disregarding the corporate entity, : 
and the action would have been on the $5,000 note rather than· 
the pledged notes. The corporation was the agent of appel-
lants in the sense that it was a processing and marketing agent 
for the producers. It is true that appellant Galbreath became 
a director of the corporation after the $5,000 note was given 
and appellants' notes were pledged but that still does not 
prevent him from asserting failure of consideration under a 
contract he had with the corporation. It was still a corporate 
entity. There is no finding that the voluntary bankruptcy 
of the corporation was not in good faith. As far as appears 
no other course was open. Indeed on the subject of disregard-
ing the corporate entity, plaintiffs state in their brief: "Plain-
tiffs have not at any time contended that the Cooperative was 
in law the alter ego of Appellants. 
"It should also be borne in mind that this is not an action 
to enforce shareholders' liability, although a number of the 
statements in the opening brief might lead the casual reader 
to so believe. As appellants have stated, it had already been 
decided that the shareholders were liable on the Corporation 
note here involved; but they have not met that obligation. 
This is an action upon promissory notes executed by Appel-
lants to the California Cooperative Producers and by that 
organization pledged to the Plaintiffs and Respondents. By 
reason of the nature of the defenses interposed by the Defend-
ants, it has become necessary to show that they were so 
closely related to the Cooperative that they cannot escape 
liability on those notes by the defenses relied. upon." 
) 
) 
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';"i-h' r.p" It will be recalled that as to appellant Winchester judgment 
t ~ given for the face amount of the note including the first 
Inasmuch as it is now conceded by plaintiffs 
this appellant was entitled to a credit for the amount of 
installment that portion of the judgment cannot stand. 
the other appellants the statute of limitation was found 
run on the first installment of each of said notes. 
judgment is reversed and the case may be retried only 
the issue of notice of nonpayment of the first installment 
time of the transfer, and judgment may thereafter be 
in accordance with the views expressed herein in the 
the determination of the issue of notice. 
; 
C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
J.-I dissent. 
, opinion it is unnecessary to remand this case to the 
_Tl' .. _· ... ·, .... for a finding on the question of notice, since the 
aha the evidence show that plaintiffs took the notes 
'notice that the first installments had not been paid. , 
I.'IIiDl'eOVElr. I do not understand by what reasoning my associ- ! 
'I'M.p.hf'ilI the conclusion that despite a finding that the trans-
'of an installment note acted in good faith and the fact 
inquiry wouid have revealed no defenses he cannot as 
of law be a holder in due course if he acquires the 
notice of the nonpayment of a past due installment. 
, tlrit question to determine is whether the first install-
due and unpaid at the time the notes were pledged. 
'confusion in the findings as to whether under the 
, agreement. payment was made upon defendants' 
frUit of enough value to meet each installment as 
due. or upon the payee's deducting the amount of 
~I4l.WU' ml' from the proceeds from the sale of the fruit. 
, found that the payee had in its possession on 
of the first installments, money and property or 
defendants "sufficient in value or amount' to pay, 
dIscharge the amount of said First installment 
of each of said respective promissory notes in full." 
.. , property, or credits referred to consisted of fruit 
. from the sale thereof. There was evidence 
nrloo~P.rl~ alone would not cover the first installments 
date thereof. It may be assumed for the purpose 
) 
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of this opinion, therefore, that the first installments were un-
paid when the notes were pledged. The question then arises 
whether plainti1fs are holders in due course. 
A holder in due course is defined in section 3133 of the Civil 
Code (N.I.L., § 52) as follows: 
.. A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the 
instrument under the following conditions: 
"(1) That it is complete and regular upon its face; 
.. (2) That he became the holder of it before it was over-
due, and without notice that it had been previously dis-
honored, if such was the fact; 
ff (8) That he took it in good faith and for value; 
"(4) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no 
notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title 
of the person negotiating it ... 
No question is raised with respect to subdivisions (1) and 
(3). Any conclusion that plaintiifA are not holders in due 
eourse must therefore be based on subdivision (2) or (4). 
The first major issue presented under these subdivisions is 
whether plainti1fR were precluded from being holders in due 
course merely because the maturity date of the first install-
ments had passed before they acquired the notes. 
Subdivision (2) specifies two conditions: The holder must 
have taken the instrument (a) before it was overdue and (b) 
without notice that it had been "previously dishonored. if 
such was the fact." 
1. ,. tMall",.f Mf. otI.rdue '" if, .",n,..tll ",1"", if u 
'I,."""f.rred "ffer fl. due Mt. of Gft tMall",." An install-
ment note is of course overdue as to installments due before 
the date of transfer, and, under subdivision (2), a transferee 
thereof cannot be a holder in due course as to such install-
ments. In the absence of the operation of an acceleration 
clause, however, the fact that the maturity date of one or 
more installments has p8Slled cannot make the instrument 
overdue as to installments payable in the future. The instru-
ment is in part overdue and in part not. Is it overdue within 
the meaning of subdivision (2)' An instrument is not over-
due until the specified maturity of the principal obligation. 
An installment note, however. has several maturities, and if 
the maturity of each installment is regarded as the' maturity 
of the instrument, then the instrument would be overdue after 
the maturity of the lIrst installment. (See 40 Harv.L.Rev. 
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~ black or white. The more realistic interpretation, and the 
, '" in accord with the expressed intention of the Uniform 
. . Instruments Act to make installment notes nego-
(Civ. Code, § 3083, N.I.L., § 2), would be that the in-
)Ii11J1D4m':t,. like the principal obligation, is overdue only as to 
. installments. but not as to installments payable in 
A contrary holding would render installment 
DOlmegotlablle after the due date of the first installment. 
a transferee could thereafter be a holder in due course 
.. subsequent installments were paid, he wouldstlll 
lUIIlena.in at his peril whether the previous install-
been paid. Thus the privilege of a holder of a 
instrument to be free from a duty to inquire into 
~.til[JJl8 between previous parties to the instrument would 
holder of an instrument payable in installments. 
··D'IIlI .. lr,..,1III who 1uJs Gequired the fWte after tit!. itt.SftlU-
IIlIIfuto'Ad.. without fWfice of its tI.OtI.ptJ"",et!.t, tI pur-
fWtic8 tMt the fWte 1uJs beet!. prMJio'Usly dis-
if it is assumed that the nonpayment of one 
JnstaDlments is tantamount to dishonor of the whole 
. the holder has no notice of dishonor unless he has 
'of nonpayment. Circulation of the instrument after 
. date of an installment except the last cannot serve as 
. the installment has not been paid. for the instru-
. designed to circulate until the maturity date of 
A transferee has no reason to conclude 
Pler8 faet that the note circulates after the due date 
~. ,. installments that such installments were not 
assume that the ordinary course of business 
....... " •• TI __ •• ::. and that the installments have been paid . 
... ~~~ § 1963(20).) Nor need the transferee of 
bilrbon,mAl1t, find a dated receipt on the note for each 
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act 
Dro,ride for such notations, and in any event they 
on the instrument by the transferor even 
:L.. ..... TI_ had not in fact been paid. 
I.;"",diawitm (4) of ,ecfiott. BtBB preclude tJ frfYMfere~, 
~~_1Ir ita due course whet!. he htJ8 fW fWM of the fGet 
1Wi~"",tJUt"'Mlr WtJ8 fWt paid wAetl due' Since the trans-
IIBtlDle that the matured installments have been 
_ ...... ~ he has no notice from the note itself of the 
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;7:'1' D061 notice of the nonpayment of an installment constitute 
~:'fwfice of dislumor of the entire note' Section 3164 of the 
Code (N.I.L., § 83) provides: "The instrument is dis-
;t.hcmo:reC1 for nonpayment when-(l)It is duly presented for 
~DayJneln and payment is refused 01' cannot be obtained; or 
Presentment is excused and the instrument is ove1'due 
unpaid." Presentment was waived on the notes involved 
.~.,~i& ease and thenfon the instruments wen dishonot'ed 
_ .. 9J',T.1'" first installments if they wen ovel'due and unpaid. 
not follow, however, that the inst1'uments wen dis-
in their entirety. Sinee an installment note can be 
and unpaid as to eertain installments. but not over-
unpaid as to others, it can likewise be dishonored 
~,~Oiq)&y:melnt as to eertain installments. but still not be 
Ihllll'lOll'M as to others. 
¥idulhOlnor by nonpayment of an installment when due 
~ltallJlOlmt to dishonor of the instrument as to futul'e in- . 
olbIIlenta, it would follow that even if that installment were i 
.rra~l11tlly paid, the whole note would be regal'ded as "pre-
CWlill0110rea." Consequently, knowledge of a trans-
one installment was paid Jate would pnclude his 
, holder in due eourse as to futul'e installments. for 
'have notiee that the instrument was "previously 
~\IRl'L," It is settled. however, under the provisions of 
Negotiable Instruments Act with respect to 
CWI:h011or to persons secondarily liable, that dishonor 
auai ..... u.u.'~n does not oonstitute dishonor of the note 8R 
Seetin 3170 of the Civil Code (N.I.L., 
'ritcJVicles that "when a negotiable instrument has been 
by nonaceeptance 01' nonpayment, notice of dis-
be given to the drawer and to each endorser, and 
. or endorser to whom such notice is not given 
1O.tIJ1U'g"ed." If dishonor' of the instrument as to one 
,eonstituted dishonor of the instrument as to all 
failUl'e of the holder to give notice of dishonor 
period Pl'eSCribed as to one installment would de-
of the right to recover from the persons sec-
,"liable, when subsequent installments wen dishon-
18, established, however, that even though the holder 
)0 give proper notice of dishonor as to an install-
- not prevented from giving such notice as to sub-
~'iD8:ta1llmeiDts that an not paid at their maturity 
BIH·l:moit. v. Kasparewiu, 121 Conn. 140, 145 [183 
/ 
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A. 693, 104 A.L.R. 1326]; Warner,e v. Preissner, 103 Conn. 
503, 507 [131 A. 25]; Roberts v. International Bank, 25 
F.2d 214, 216; Ohamberlain v. Oobb, 129 Wash. 54!>, 551 
[225 P. 141]; see 10 C.J.S. 896; Uniform Laws Annotated, 
Negotiable Instruments, n. 13 to § 89.} 
An analogy is presented by the eases involving nonpay-
ment of one of a series of notes. According to the cases de-
eided under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, knowl-
edge of the dishonor of one of the notes does not con.'3titutc 
notice that all of the notes of the series are dishonored. 
(Hobart M. Oable 00. v. Bruce, 135 Okla. 170, 171 [274 P. 
665, 64 A.I •. R. 451]; M01'gan v. Farmington Ooal & Ooke 00., 
97 W.Va. 83, 99 [124 S.E. 591] ; Brannan, Negotiable Instru-
ments 566; c/., however. 64 A.L.R. 457, 458 (collection of 
eases decided under common law principles).} 
The conclusion seems inescapable therefore that if knowl-
edge of nonpayment of a past due installment precludes. a 
purchaser from being a holder in due course as to unmatured 
installments, it is not because of the provisions of subdivision 
(2) of Civil Code section 3133 (N.I.L., § 52(2).) It remains 
only to determine whether such a result is justified by the 
provisions of subdivision (4). 
Is notice 0/ the nonpayment 0/ an installment, as a matter 
of law, notice 0/ I'any infirmity in the inst1"1Lment or deled 
in thelitle 0/ the person negotiating" the note witkin the 
meaning 0/ subdivision (I.) 0/ Oim1 Oode section 3133 (N.I.L., 
§ 52( I.)}' Section 3137 of the Civil Code (N.I.L., § 56) pro-
vides, UTo eonstitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument 
or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same. the 
person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowl-
edge of the infirmity or defect. or knowledge of s11ch facts 
that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad 
faith." Knowledge that an installment has not been paid 
when due is clearly not actual knowledge of an infirmity in 
the instrument itself or of a defect in the title of the person 
negotiating it. To prevent the transferee from becoming a 
holder in due course, such knowledge must therefore be knowl-
edge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument 
amounted to bad faith. 
Under subdivision (4) of Civil Code, section 3133 (N.I.L., 
§ 52(4», therefore, if an installment is not paid when due, 
notice of that fact does not, as a matter of law, preclude the 
transferee from being a holder in due course. Such notice is 
/ 
) 
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at most evidence of bad faith to be weighed by the trier of 
!acts with the other facts to determine whether the transferee 
, the note in question in good faith. Even if it be as-
that such knowledge would be sufficient to put a pru· 
man on inquiry to determine if the note was subject to 
the transferee is not thereby deemed to have acquired 
bad faith, for negligence is not a bar to recovery on 
leacma,Dle instrument. Civil Code, section 3137 (N.I.L., 
makes the good or bad faith of the transferee the 
In construing this provision, this court has fol· 
general rule "that mere knowledge of facts suffi· 
put a prudent man on inquiry, without actual know}· 
. suspicion of an infirmity or defect of title, does 
bi'tllelU(le the transferee from occupying the position of a 
course, unless the circumstances or suspicions 
and obvious that to remain passive would amount 1 
It (Popp v. Exchange Bank, 189 Cal. 296, 303 
; Goodale v. Thorn, 199 Cal. 307, 314 [249 P. 11]; 
l'(lll'.tL"l~tJ Sav. Bank v. Bent Br08., 207 Cal. 652, 656 
Nuckolls v. Bank of Calif., 10 Cal.2d 278, 284 
; Barthelme88 v. Cavalier, 2 Cal.App.2d 477, 
484]; Imperial GYP8'Um ~ Oil Co. v. Chaplin, 
~:LP}J'.''''u. 109, 113 [40 P.2d 5961; see 5 Uniform Laws 
o;;K"WCI,U~" Instruments, n. 31·136 to § 56; Bran· 
1IlK."'IoUi,U~" Instruments, 6th ed., 636-641; Rightmire, 
in Negotiable Paper, 18 Mich.L.Rev. 355, 367.368; 
","~."..._ and Notes, 411415; 81 U. of PaL.Rev. 617.) 
. section 56, • . • a purchaser is not charge· 
of an infirmity or defect in the instrument 
knowledge of the infirmity or defect, or 
facts that his action in taking the instru-
bad faith.' The statute by its terms ex-
iatl'nm:ive notice." (Allen v. Cooling, 161 Minn. 10, 
.) 
that one or more installments of an install-
UllJ;'lUU when the note is negotiated does not 
~'~JD!l<n1rl6(llZ6 to the transferee of a defense against the 
. it reveal such knowledge of. circumstances that 
that the holder of the note shut his eyes to the 
bad faith sought to avoid the kn<n1rledge of a 
that respect there is no dUference between a trans-
. negotiable instrument with knowledge that one or 
J ... <." • 
! 
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more installments of interest are unpaid and a transferee with 
knowledge that one or more installments of principal are un-
paid. Before the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Act there was a conflict of authority with regard to the 
effect of the late payment of an installment of interest. Under 
the Uniform Act, however, the rule is now generally recog-
nized to be that "knowledge that interest is due and unpaid 
does not, of itself constitute bad faith, but such fact may be 
taken into consideration by the jury along with other facts on 
the issue of purchase in good. faith. " (Britton, Bills and 
Notes, 456-457; City of New Port Richey v. Fidelity «t De-
posit Co., 105 F.2d 348, 352.) 
Similarly, notice of a default in the payment of an install-
ment of principal disconnected from other facts does not pre-
vent the transferee from being a holder in due course. Nor 
does such notice alone constitute bad faith and put the holder 
under a duty to make an inquiry. Even if good. faith would 
require the transferee to make an inquiry, it would not neces-
sarily follow that he could not still be a holder in due course. 
The inquiry may reveal that the default is fully explained 
by the circumstances and that it constitutes no warning that 
the maker has a defense with regard to installments to mature 
in the future. Thus, it may appear that prompt payment has 
been waived and that· the delay with regard to one or more 
past due installments does not exceed the delay in the pay-
ment of other installments that have been paid late in the 
past. Failure to pay a past due installment may . arise from 
unexpected circumstances affecting the ability of a maker to 
pay rather than from an equitable defense. Many installment 
notes containing an aece1eration clause provide that the holder 
can accelerate future installments only if one or more past 
installments remain unpaid for a specified period. In such 
cases installments are frequently paid in the interval between 
the maturity date of the installment and the date at which 
under the terms of the note the holder would be entitled to 
accelerate future payments. A rule would be contrary to 
common experience that held in each case in which a past 
due installment is unpaid, notice of such fact alone is notice 
that the maker has a defense against future installments 
payable under the note. 
In my opinion, therefore, the rule set forth in the majority 
opinion that a purchaser of an installment note who has knowl-
edp that a past due installment was unpaid when he acquired 
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the note "is put on inquiry that there may be some defenses 
against it and . . . cannot be a holder in due course" cannot 
be reconciled with the provisions of the Uniform Negotiable 
,hstrwnents Act. The cases cited for this proposition include 
three cases decided under the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
.. u.:,,= .... Act. Of these three cases, only one actually held that 
late payment of an installment precludes a subsequent 
I,'i~eha.ser from being a holder in due course. (Hibbard v. 
t:{]OU,'I8, 127 Me. 383, 386 [143 A. 600).) That case in fact 
notice was immaterial, apparently on the theory 
n"~FWrlftAn the first installment was overdue the whole note was 
(See Brannan, Negotiable Instruments, 566.) Obvi-
majority opinion in the present case is not based on 
that the note was overdue as to all installments, 
question whether plaintiffs are holders in due course 
turn on whether or not they had notice of the non-
iWtIItent of an installment. In Oity of New Port Richey v. 
tt Deposit 00., 105 F.2d 348. 352, there is a dictum 
that notice of the nonpayment of an installment 
a subsequent purchaser from being a holder in due 
<, The actual holding of that' case, however, is that 
nonpayment of interest, though not in law notice of 
, is a fact to be considered with all other circum-
the question of the bona fides of the taking." The 
lHimtv opinion places great reliance on a statement in 
State, v. Oapen, 55 F.Supp. 81, 83, but the actual de-
that case turned on a rule adopted in some jurisdic-
where an installment note contains an automatic 
W4tta1:ion clause and the maker fails to pay the tirst install-
whole note is automatically overdue. (Cf., however, 
il'fttn." Zook, 125 Cal.App. 19, 22 [13 P.2d 518]; Sullivan 
!JItjillMfI,. 25 Cal.App.2d 422, 425 [77 P.2d 498].) 
decided under common law principles, the one 
Tdeeid:iDg' the question under the Uniform Negotiable In-
and the dicta in the other cases relied on in 
rJliJi~jol'ity opinion, are all based on the theory that the 
was a purchaser of overdue paper or was a pur-
notice of dishonor. {See Britton, Bills and Notes. 
has already been observed that there is no suppo .... 
theory in the provisions of the Uniform Negotiabic 
Act. The majority opinion cannot be brought 
purview of that act unless it is regarded as hold-
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ing that as a matter of law anyone who purchases an install-
ment note with knowledge that an installment is unpaid 
is a purchaser in bad faith. But even then it cannot be re-
conciled with the act, as is well illustrated by the facts of 
the present ease. 
Plaintiifs gave a loan of $5,000 to a corporation in which 
they had no int(rest and with which they had no other busi. 
ness connections. Even if they knew that the hat install-
ments had not been paid and good faith required an inquiry 
when the notes were pledged, such an inquiry could not have ' 
revealed the defense of subsequent failure of consideration I 
now set up to bar their recovery on the notes. Plaintiffs could 
not learn in advance that years later the corporation would 
become insolvent and be unable to perform its obligations 
under ita contract with the makers. The role adopted by the 
majority of this court actually empowers the maker of an in-
sta11m.ent note to render the note nonnegotiable by refusing ! 
to pay an insta11m.ent, for knowledge of that facts precludes a ; 
transferee's being a holder in due course. Such a role contra- ! 
dicta the basic principle of the statute that a transferee of a 
negotiable instrument is not required, except by considera-
tions of honesty and good faith, to enter upon an inquiry 
with regard to transactions that have given rise to the issu-
ance of the instrument. 
If the principles set forth in the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
menta Act are applied to this ease, knowledge that the first 
insta11m.ents were not paid would not as a matter of law pre-
vent plaintitrs from being holders in due course. It would 
merely be evidence that plaintitr8 might not have acquired 
the notes in good faith. Good faith may require a transferee 
to make an inquiry on the basis of such knowledge depend-
ing on the facta of the particular case. What constitutes good 
faith is essentially a question of fact and depends on the 
circumstances in each case. For example. if the purchaser 
knew that one or niore of the installments were not paid on 
the due date and made a reasonable inquiry that revealed only 
that the payments had not been made because of some reason 
unconnected with any defense, be 8hould not be barred from 
recovery on the note merely because of subsequent failure of 
consideration, a defense that could not have been known at the 
time. On the other hand, if the purchaser acquired the note 
with knowledge that several installments had not been paid, 
it would appear that he failed to act in good faith if he failed 
/ 
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'fa. ~make an inquiry, unless the lIurrounding circumstances 
·Ih~ed that this failure was attributable to negligence and not 
·dishonesty. Such que.c:;tions, however, are que.c:;tion.c:; of fact 
the trial court or jury and should only be considered mat-
onaw when the facts are not in conflict and not reason· 
.• sUsceptible of conflicting inferences. 
the holding of the majority opinion. the negotiability 
llUJUUllmeu~ notes has been seriously impaired. After any 
• ..,..-., .. n has matured, it is unsafe for a purchaser, even 
he acta in good faith, to acquire such a note without 
. eertaiil that all past due installments have been paid. . 
as a holder in due course may be questioned at some 
by the maker's merely asserting that an install-
.. unpaid at the time of the transfer and that the 
had. knowledge of that fact. [n such a situation. 
had a defense that involves the title of the payee, 
f~~dEIr' would have the burden of showing that either the 
was paid when due or that he had no notice of 
• (Civ. Code, § 3140; N.I.L., § 59.) In view of the 
. responsibility of the trier of facts under decisions 
, (see Estate of B1'istol, 23 Ca1.2d 221, 223 (143 
) there is always the risk that the evidence might 
smieeptible of an inference that the holder had notice 
of a past due installment . 
.... ··nnn.... the rule of law announced in the majority 
is unnecessary to remand this ease to the trial court 
. of notice. 
court found "That the first installment of each 
given to plaintiff as security for the note of 
Producers were past due on its face at the 
transfer of said noteR to plaintiffs, and that plain-
holders in due course of said collateral notes; but 
finds that said plaintiffs were purchasers and 
notes in good faith and !Of' value and without 
.. equity or defense of defendants or any of 
(Italics added.) It was the position of the de-
'the trial that the notice of nonpayment of the 
~lLlJ:Jnelllts was irrelevant since the date for the pay-
:.JOIl4'l'eCll had passed before the notes were transferred to 
the principles already discussed, the effect 
nonpayment of a prior installment is pertinent 
question whether or not the purchaser acquired 
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plaintiffs were not holders in due course, except in regard to 
the first installments, it is obvious that the "finding" that 
plaintiffs were not holders in due course is based upon de-
fendants' theory and is an erroneous conclusion of law. 
Since the trial court found that plaintiffs were holders of 
the notes in question "in good faith and for value without 
notice of an equity or defense of defendants," it follows that 
the plaintiffs are holders in due course. This finding on its 
face, under the foregoing principles of law, can mean only one 
of two things: (1) plaintiffs purchased the notes without 
knowledge that the first installments were unpaid, or (2) even 
if the first installments were not paid when due and plaintiffs 
had knowledge of that fact, under the circumstances of the 
case, plaintiffs were nonetheless acting in good faith when 
they acquired the notes. Since either question is one of good I 
faith, if either theory is supported by the evidence, the judg- i 
ment must be affirmed. except to the extent that it allows 
plaintiffs to recover against defendant Winchester for the 
first installment of her note. This installment was either 
paid before the transfer of the note or was subject to de-
fenses. Since it was overdue, plaintiffs were not holders in 
due course as to it. 
Even if it is assumed that under the facts of the present 
case the trial court would not have found that plaintiffs were 
purchasers in good faith if it believed that the plaintiffs had 
notice of the nonpayment of the first installment. the reaaon-
able construction of the finding in regard to the good faith of 
plaintiffs is that they acquired the notes without such notice. 
A holder of a negotiable instrument is "deemed prima facie 
a holder in due course .. " (Civ. Code. § 3140. N.I.L., § 59), 
and a person who acquires an installment note after an install-
ment is due is entitled to rely on the presumption that the 
due course of business has been followed. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1963.) Since it is an established principle that all infer-
ences and presumption must be applied to support the judg-
meat of the court. the trial court's finding that the plaintiff 
acquired the notes in question as "purchasers and holders 0 
said notes in good faith and for value and without notice 0 
any equity or defense of defendants . . ." must be construe 
as a finding that the notes were acquired without notice 0 
nonpayment of the first installments. 
The remaining question is whether this construction of th 
finding is supported by the evidence. The principal plaintifli 
-- that he knew nothing of the status of the PI1 
) 
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Dotes and that be relied on the recommendation of a Mr. 
Andel'l'On, the president of a bank that later acted as plain-
~ agent in delivering the notes. Plaintiff testified that Mr. 
'Anderson told him that the notes would be secured by grow-
8it/... DOtes but that Mr. Anderson did not tell him of the r of the grow,,,,' not ... 
, 
',,»ef, ' endants introduced no evidence sufficient to controvert 
. testimony. Mr. Anderson was called as defendants' wit-
. , ·.but he was able to state only that he advised one of the 
MidntJml that the corporation would use the money to start 
.... "', ...... ~ ... in Sacramento and that it would be advantageous 
and to this plaintiff. Mr. Anderson te..<;tified that 
not recall whether at that time he knew anything 
status of the growers' notes. The testimony of this 
was struck from the record as irrelevant. Defendants 
that the testimony was admissible to show that the 
knew of the status of the notes and that he was plain-
&gent. The only agency shown, however, was that the 
bank was subsequently the agent for the delivery of 
and none of the testimony struck tended to show that 
had any knowledge of the nonpayment or of any 
available to defendant..q at that time. 
contended that an inference that plaintiffs had notice I 
first installment was overdue could be drawn from 
that the $5,000 note from the California Cooperative 
contained a list of the installment notes transferred 
u~~t;Uf8 as security, because this li..<;t designated the full 
rllllinOlmt of each of the pledged notes. It is evident on 
the principal note, however, that the full amounts 
for purposes of identification. It was necessary to 
full face amount of each note, since the principal 
tulC1l1ted by the corporation, after enumerating the notes 
, stated, "The maker her('.of may, while not 
substitute as security hereunder, in place of any 
note or notes, note or notes of its grower members, of 
. form and character." Even if the trial court 
reasonably inferred from the listing of the notes 
full amounts that plaintiffs had knowledge of the 
RVTn ... 'T of the first installments, it was free to draw or 
draw such an inference. 
J .. concurred. 
